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Modern Western convictions that freedom, equality, and personal autonomy are all crucial human goods structure both our thinking and our practice in deep and pervasive ways. Even when these values do not thoroughly shape our politics, we tend to judge this as a failing. While there is much to celebrate about these ideals and even their imperfect realization in various spheres of modern life, they also cast long shadows that confuse our self-understanding and muddle our interpretation of alien cultures and the possibilities they present.
These shadows also obscure crucial ethical and political issues, notably regarding interpersonal authority and hierarchical social relations.
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For instance, a dominant modern Western tendency, especially among intellectuals, is to exalt individual autonomy and to be suspicious of hierarchical relations, which are often conceived in terms of domination that is either direct and forceful or subtle and soulcrippling. This tendency to interpret hierarchy in terms of domination echoes and reinforces the attention given to justifying coercive authority in political theory. In other words, much contemporary political theory concerns the question of who might be justified in ruling, These tendencies, however, easily trick social critics into reading any sort of hierarchy as by definition an exercise in domination that is at best a necessary evil-something that needs to be tolerated but limited as much as possible.
But certain sorts of hierarchy are not only necessary in the negative sense that we have not figured out how to live communally without coercive force; they are also necessary in a more positive sense, because human flourishing relies on certain forms of hierarchy. It would help contemporary Westerners to better understand these issues, both so that we are not tempted to attack one of the conditions of our own happiness, and so that we may also avoid the reactive temptation to defend too many kinds of hierarchical authority as good.
The larger project from which this essay derives aims to explore the pursuit of mastery as a potentially compelling justification for hierarchical relationships, one that avoids certain pitfalls familiar from Western justifications and critiques of various kinds of social authority, including slavery and the subordination of women. Reflecting upon what it might mean to master an activity, art, or mode of being can show what sorts of hierarchical relations are necessary and constructive for creatures like us, with relatively adaptable instincts that are inevitably and dramatically shaped by culture, language, and practice.
2 Human flourishing, it would seem, requires investment in the practice of mastery, both of self and of various activities.
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Despite this, liberal political theory, which represents the mainstream of American political philosophy, has little interest in or sympathy with attempts to cultivate human potentials in any organized, public way. Such efforts are often seen as smacking of "perfectionism," the supposedly futile and destructive effort by government to demand a heroic level of virtue from the general populace. 4 The fear behind these criticisms is of tyrannical government, a fear nurtured over centuries in the modern West through struggles against oppressive kings, religious leaders, and other elites, against slavery as a paradigm of unjust domination, and finally against totalitarianism. There are very real dangers here that should not be overlooked.
In this essay I explore these issues by moving through a sequence of steps. First, I briefly expand and nuance the claims made above about "the modern West" and our suspicion of hierarchy, through historical arguments about the development of a view of people as free makers of contracts rather than as holders of birth-related statuses. The point of this first section is to make plausible the idea that contemporary Westerners need to rethink our stalnak er Mastery, Authority, and Hierarchy understanding of authority and hierarchy. In the second section I argue, perhaps surprisingly, that ancient Chinese thought, especially a number of implicit and explicit early accounts of salutary teacher-student relations, offers important and underutilized resources for reexamining these issues. In the third section, I consider one influential early Chinese text, the "Inner Chapters" of the Zhuāngzǐ. This text might at first seem to fit poorly with the account of teaching relations discussed in the second section, but I argue that we should be suspicious of anachronistic readings of this text as advocating freedom and even liberation. Instead, the Inner Chapters seem to suggest that human beings need teachers to attain crucial insights into life, and that we should conform to at least some powers, forces, and authorities, but reject others as counterfeit.
Modern Western Problems with Hierarchy
Needless to say, the history of the development of the modern world is so complicated that it is far beyond the scope of this essay to grapple with it adequately. Instead, I propose to briefly discuss the ideal of autonomy as a cen- The political and moral appeal of autonomy as an ideal is found in the thought that domination of other human beings is wrong and should be prohibited to the greatest extent possible; protecting individual autonomy has seemed to many to be an essential, defining component of struggles against oppression. Suspicion of domination, even in seemingly benign forms, has very deep roots in the West, which are discernible in two large and complex historical trends: the repeated debates over the practice of slavery and the gradual growth of the "social contract" tradition of political theorizing, which takes the autonomous household head as its basic unit. 14 Relations between rulers and their ministers were quite fraught, and opportunities for treachery abounded. From blood oaths of fealty to careful specification of job requirements and performance that would yield either ample salary or harsh punishment, numerous novel arrangements to recruit, retain, and control loyal, hard-working subordinates were tried in order to replace older methods of enfeoffing relatives. In this context educated talent was in demand, and this stimulated a market in educational services, arguably started by Confucius himself (i.e., Kǒngzǐ, c. 551-479 BCE).
Warring States texts appear to have developed in tandem with various teaching groups, and these writings provide ample evidence that "masters,"
shī 師, of quite various "arts" or "techniques," shù 術, trained students and consulted with leaders. Historian Mark Edward Lewis (1999, 53-97) sees the whole phenomenon of early Chinese extra-governmental writing as centered on "master" figures, whom he thinks are largely constituted by their respective textual traditions. Lewis focuses on the "teaching scene" that characterizes texts like the Analects and Mèngzǐ as the defining formal feature of such texts;
he thinks these dramatic encounters between wise masters and aspiring learners expose deep commitments in these traditions about the character of true wisdom and sageliness, the limited adequacy of language, and proper methods of teaching and leadership. These two ideological families have strikingly different attitudes toward hierarchical relations. The texts that advocate cultivating dé emphasize the ideal of sagehood, and seem to invite readers to seek a higher realization of human potential. Although the details vary, these texts (with the exception of the Daòdéjīng) 16 often portray hierarchical relationships within teaching groups as characterized by the activities of questioning, debate, and justification, and the virtues of loyalty, respect, and shared reverence for the Daò, or Way. Teachers in these texts tend to speak with authority, relying on the trust and willing compliance of their audiences, although sometimes only after aggressive questioning. Some thinkers also hoped political leaders would operate in the same way, ruling authoritatively by means of virtue, although they clearly recognized the difference between their ideals and the brutal reality of their social context.
By contrast, the dé skeptics describe and advocate methods of control that they contend are well suited to political and military affairs. They view human beings more often as tools to be used than as agents to be cultivated. A fundamental aim in these texts, regardless of their broader goals, is to attain effective and reliable control of subordinates. To this end these texts explore and advocate various methods for coercing obedience, including rule by means of law, the strict regulation of rewards and punishments, and administrative theories about bureaucratic responsibilities and performance. These texts, in other words, care more about power, in the sense of the ability to compel others to obey a ruler's will, than they do about authority, willing loyalty, and shared reverence, which they view as questionable luxuries that will fail under stress with most people.
I have written at length elsewhere on aspects of early Rú texts that are relevant to these themes (Stalnaker 2006; . Most of the early Rú seem to have advocated personal attainment of virtue, which they construe as not only good character but also skilled and charismatic moral leadership. The A nalects and Mèngzǐ both constantly depict their respective masters answering questions and dispensing advice and admonition to students, most of whom are portrayed as loyal and thoughtful, even if imperfect. They also depict generally long-standing relationships between masters and their students, and celebrate the process of education and personal formation as a lifelong daò.
All of these characteristics will be utilized, although often ironically, in the celebrated early text Zhuāngzǐ, to which I now turn. disciples depending on what they needed to hear at any given moment, in his judgment (e.g., 11.22)-indeed, it is perhaps a more radical version of that same tendency. Thus, as interpreters, we should not try to achieve premature closure by harmonizing different stories' "main points" or expect key words or phrases to always cohere into a clearly specifiable philosophy. The text is more like a kaleidoscope than a map, and any attempt at a fully unified reading will need to take account of conflicting textual evidence.
One important consequence of this variation is a pervading sense of uncertainty about what to make of any given teacher, especially given the possibility that the supposed master might turn out to be more suited to the role of student, as Kǒngzǐ is, for example, in relation to Wáng Tái or Yán
Huí (C 144-45, 205-6; W 68-69, 90-91) . So the reader is not just perplexed Beyond these send-ups of famous sages, kings, traditions, and sacred texts, the Zhuāngzǐ also offers fierce criticisms of rival intellectual tendencies, Yán Huí, here cast as the well-meaning activist out to "make a difference" in the world by changing the mind and policies of the powerful (C 107-17;
W 54-58). The payoff of this critical devastation is to reduce the student to a state of bewilderment and openness to new ideas. At the climax of the story Kǒngzǐ scolds Yán Huí for continuing to "take his heart/mind as his master/ teacher," and then swoops in to provide explicit instructions in "mental fasting" designed to "empty" one's heart/mind so that one can begin to perceive reality through attention to qì 氣, "vital energy," rather than using one's rational, socially formed and educated mind to assess and measure things and scenarios in the world. As a brilliant student, Yán Huí catches on immediately, to Kǒngzǐ's evident satisfaction.
The second, much briefer dialogue, on "sitting and forgetting," makes clear that conventional Confucian duties and practices should be "forgotten"
if one wishes, like Yán Huí, to "make progress" (C 205-6; W 90-91). After a few days of practice Yán Huí turns the tables on Confucius by going beyond these initial steps to simply "sit and forget" everything, including his own body and understanding, in order to 同於大通, "become the same as the great pervader." Confucius immediately recognizes Yán Huí's superiority, and politely asks to become his follower.
The majority of explicit teaching scenes in the Inner Chapters follow this pattern: a relatively brief encounter or liaison leads to the student realizing a dramatic negative epiphany, which frees him from some sort of delusional attachment to a conventional daò, opening him up to a new life in harmony with the world as it is, rather than as humans imagine it to be. Sharp criticism and rebuke appear to be perfectly acceptable modes of teaching in the text, designed to produce confusion, openness, and insight (although perhaps these are narrative devices, designed to work indirectly on a reader).
The goal seems to be not the imparting of information, nor any sustained training in the mastery of a skill, but rather the giving of insight and a new vision, a changed perspective. This theme of "sudden enlightenment" reverberates through later Chinese religious history. cut off as a punishment, and this relationship has gone on for nineteen years (C 150; W 70-71). And the opening story of chapter 5 describes one Wáng Tái, who despite having no feet (presumably due to penal sanctions), not "teaching" or even talking, is able, through the spontaneous effects of his "stillness,"
to calm anxious hearts and help at least some followers return to an inner state of equilibrium and peace. Confucius declares him to be a sage, and describes his excellence at some length (C 144-45; W 68-69).
Despite occasional mention of a "wordless" teaching, as for example with Wáng Tái, most of the teaching in the Inner Chapters is rather wordy, going on extensively to critique errors and describe a higher gnosis, however
obscurely. This verbosity suggests that words may in fact be the most effective teaching tools available if the targets are human beings; or perhaps this is simply an artifact of the textual form itself, which leaves Zhuāngzǐ with no other tools to use as he tries to communicate his vision.
One surprising feature of these teaching scenes is how rarely they dramatize any sustained course of training, or involve any demonstrations of capability by the teacher figure. Given the prevalence of interpretations of the positive side of the text in terms of the notion of skill or "knack," one would expect there to be a richer array of material to analyze. 25 Two stories in the Inner Chapters seem at least to allude to the idea of extended practice, and so deserve fuller analysis: the encounter between the cook and Lord Wénhuì that makes up most of chapter 3, and the sequence of teaching contests in chapter 6 between Húzǐ and the divination specialist as they vie for influence over the student Lièzǐ.
The story of the cook explicitly describes a fairly lengthy period of practicing a craft, and seems to suggest this is very important (C 95-96;
W 50-51). In the tale Lord Wénhuì observes the beautiful spectacle of his cook carving up an ox, which he does so smoothly and well that the text likens him to a dancer harmonizing with two celebrated classical musical pieces.
The lord exclaims over the cook's skill, but the cook says that he loves the Daò, and has "advanced beyond skill." He then explains how he got to this point: at first he saw nothing but oxen, but after three years of practice he no longer saw each ox as a whole, and eventually arrived at his current state, where he uses his shén 神, "spirit," to perceive rather than his senses, and lets "spiritual" desires proceed in place of his perceptual knowledge. He then discusses at some length how much more effective he is than lesser cooks, who have to sharpen their knives repeatedly-he, by contrast, no longer needs to sharpen it at all. In normal butchering he is able to zip along by relying on the "H eavenly patterns" in the ox, in easy accord with "how it necessarily is" (依乎天理 . . . 因其固然). In difficult and unusual situations he has to slow down and pay careful attention, then in a moment of insight he sees what he must do, and cuts through the difficulty in one precise stroke. After this display and discussion, Lord Wénhuì exclaims that through listening to the cook's words he has attained insight into the "nurture of life" (吾聞庖丁之言，得養生焉).
Several aspects of this narrative deserve comment in relation to present concerns. First, it is yet another teaching scene, but with the cook in the role of teacher, which is an extreme inversion of usual social hierarchies and expectations. The teaching itself consists of a lecture, which only begins subsequently to the demonstration of mastery with which the story opens. The student, in this case a king, learns an apparently important lesson on "nurturing life," a topic that at the very least is in some tension with the skill of butchering. The king thus arrives at an epiphany, although in this case positive, an insight rather than a disillusioning realization. The dissonance of a butcher teaching the nurturing of life suggests that his mastery is not merely to be taken literally, but as a metaphor for good living in general. Perhaps the knife symbolizes his heart/mind, in its ability to jiě 解, "cut through," "resolve," or "understand" difficulties (the word is used in this sense in several places in the Inner Chapters). Insofar as it never needs "sharpening" but is always ready for any situation, he uses his knife, and by extension his heart/mind, with mostly effortless perfection and effectiveness, and needs no further development or cultivation. Such a reading could explain the otherwise mysterious "moral" of the story that the king draws from the lecture, which suggests broad applicability to the cook's capabilities, which "go beyond skill" and reflect a love for the Heavenly Daò itself.
The cook does describe a lengthy period of practice before his present state of mastery, but during this time he apparently did not have a teacher and seems to have learned how to handle his knife on his own. He is particularly focused on perception, and his distrust of normal human perception and judgment echoes Kǒngzǐ's teaching to Yán Huí to "listen by means of vital energy" rather than with his mind and ears, which are guided by preconceived notions and only seek what "matches up" with such notions (C 117; W 58). The crucial question is exactly how to generalize from the cook's speech to the grand conclusion derived from it by Lord Wénhuì. Should one become a butcher to live well? Should one become a disciplined expert in some craft?
Should one learn how to perceive, act, and smoothly "cut through" life's difficulties after the manner of the cook? I incline toward the last interpretation and suggest that the story reflects a sensibility in which one can be inspired to self-reflection by others but must do considerable work by oneself to learn how to see "Heaven's patterns" and "what is necessarily so" clearly within one's own life and work, whatever it might be, without obscurations introduced by socially formed prejudices about correctness or incorrectness.
The story of the cook raises the question of whether Zhuāngzǐ thinks one ever truly needs to submit to a teacher who guides one over a period of time to a deeper understanding of anything, whether life itself, some art or craft, or the ability to "listen by means of vital energy," or "use one's heart like a mirror" (see C 227; W 97). 26 It appears that the prevailing view in the Inner Chapters is that people need a teacher to jolt them out of their all-too-human frenzy or stupor (depending on how they have internalized whatever daò they have been taught is correct), and some at least benefit from a more lengthy relationship. This is so because normal education and even just enculturation seem to make us submit to the wrong authorities in the wrong way, that is, too obediently and rigidly, and we need corrective intervention. In the second "positive" story I consider here, Húzǐ 壺子, the "wine pot" master, analogizes people who have not had a real teacher to hens laying eggs with no rooster around to impregnate them; without a teacher, it seems, our efforts to live well will be sterile and barren (C 220-21; W 94-97).
In this story, the character Lièzǐ has been a student of Húzǐ for some time, but stumbles across a shén wū 神巫, or "spiritual wizard," who is expert at the widespread divinatory practice of xiāng 相, "physiognomy," whereby he can foretell people's time of death with great precision. Lièzǐ meets with the diviner, and his heart becomes "drunk," amazed and enraptured by the diviner's powers. (In contrast, regular people fear and shun the diviner-this is in diametric opposition to the various deformed or unusual "masters" throughout the rest of the Inner Chapters, who are all powerfully attractive to other people because of their ample dé.) Lièzǐ tells Húzǐ that he has found a new teacher with a "more ultimate" daò than Húzǐ's. Húzǐ immediately berates Lièzǐ for his ignorance and arrogance, telling him that he has only shown him his daò's wén 文, "form," "ornament," or perhaps even "text,"
but not yet shown him its shí 實, "reality" or "substance." This is quite intriguing, because it suggests that Húzǐ has been gradually teaching Lièzǐ more and more about the Daò, over time, but has not yet arrived at the most important lessons, and so Lièzǐ does not even realize how far he yet has to go. Húzǐ explicitly questions whether Lièzǐ has really dé 得, "gotten" or "attained" it yet. Húzǐ contends that Lièzǐ's arrogant broadcasting of what little he knows allows lesser masters like the diviner to scan and physiognimize him.
As the story develops, Húzǐ asks Lièzǐ to bring the diviner to see him several times, and each time Húzǐ presents a different appearance to the diviner, and each time the diviner reports a rather different fate awaiting Húzǐ. To speculate about what this could possibly mean, one might guess that Húzǐ is a master of his own flows of vital energy, able to allow it to pool deep within his body but also flow in various ways. He is in other words not just able to read others' flows, like the diviner, but can assume various "forms" as he wishes, in this case to demonstrate his radical superiority over the lesser arts and capability of the diviner.
In the end Húzǐ shows the diviner a state in which he "has not yet emerged from his ancestor," which so alarms the diviner that he flees, and Lièzǐ cannot catch him. Lièzǐ then realizes that he "had not yet begun to learn" and "returned," perhaps to Húzǐ's tutelage, probably to his own home. Lièzǐ stays there for three years, cooking for his wife and feeding the pigs as if serving people. He "returned to simplicity from carving and polishing," "taking his position like a clump alone in his own form," remaining "scattered but sealed" until the end of his life. This remarkable conclusion uses language loaded with connotations related to self-cultivation. He leaves behind the "carving and polishing" of his character and demeanor as advocated by Confucian readings of the Odes for a return to "simplicity," or more literally the "uncarved block" celebrated in the Daòdéjīng and similar texts. Lièzǐ disregards normal human conventions, roles, and rules, and simply lives out his days.
This story seems to suggest that a more lengthy apprenticeship is possible, and that some version of mastering human living involves a gradual mastery of one's own energy flows, although it is far from clear exactly how this is to be accomplished, and the text spends no time advocating particular techniques other than "mental fasting" and "sitting and forgetting," neither of which are very precise at the level of technical details, focusing more on effects and stages of a progression of "forgetting" the self. 27 So in the end, the Lièzǐ-Húzǐ story represents not a positive apprenticeship where skills are gradually developed, but another epiphany story, with a decisive turning point after which
Lièzǐ seems basically perfected as a Zhuangzian sage.
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What are we to make of these mysterious descriptions and hints at exceptional capabilities? I think they may be allusions to mystical states of various sorts, but they are clearly advertisements for Zhuāngzǐ's own take on life, making it sound as grand and fulfilling as anything could be. And they may very well be evocative, poetic descriptions of the ease, delight, and relaxed tranquility of the sort of consciousness and mode of life that Zhuāngzǐ celebrates in his many tales of unusual exemplars. The teaching scenes in the Zhuāngzǐ seem to hinge over and over again on breakthroughs in consciousness, epiphanies that reorient a "student" away from social conventions and toward a deeper reality of some sort. Teachers exist in the text in order to provoke these epiphanies.
Where does this leave the question of Zhuāngzǐ's views of personal " freedom" and submission to authorities? Just as we should read the occasional tales of superhuman sages who are invulnerable to harm as parables about the mindset of the fearless, unattached sage, rather than as hints at actual superpowers, we should similarly read talk of "roaming beyond the four directions" not as literally describing amazing journeys, nor as parables of absolute freedom from any and all constraints, but rather as the promise of "release from the bonds" of human conventions that are understood wrongly. This is emphatically not release from what is "inevitable," such as death, and perhaps even certain roles and obligations in society, if we are to take Confucius at his word in chapter 4 as he is instructing Zǐgaō about how to handle his inevitable duties as a governmental envoy (C 122-23; W 59-61) . Such human conventions would be understood not as binding norms that demand obedience, but rather as something akin to land formations or weather patterns, realities that must be recognized and negotiated as one moves through the humanpopulated world.
The ultimate submission, finally, is to Heaven and its lǐ 理, "patterns,"
and nì 倪, "distinctions," as well as what is bùdéyǐ 不得已, "inevitable," and gùrán 固然, "necessarily so." As Master Yú tells Master Sì on his deathbed in chapter 6, "things [including human beings] do not ultimately triumph over
Heaven," and the paradigmatic example of this subjection is our vulnerability to death. One should not "hate" or rebel against the workings of Heaven and its decrees, but instead 安時而處順, "be at peace with the time and dwell in what is suitable," 29 accepting whatever changes come, however "good" or "bad," "auspicious" or "inauspicious" they might seem (C 189; W 84-85). as discussed above, but they generally pass these tests easily. 30 Perhaps these friendships are all that "true people" really need, once a teacher has helped to catalyze their transformation into acceptance from stubborn rebellion.
Thus, even in the Zhuāngzǐ we find the advocacy of teaching and learning, albeit in a distinctive mode. And while there is a sort of liberation promised in the text, it is not simply the removal of all constraints and the leap into a realm of unrestrained freedom. Delusory, socially constructed norms are "forgotten" in the sense that they no longer provoke anxiety, fear, or yearning, but instead are seen clearly as aspects of the social landscape, projected into being by humans, who usually still loom large for human beings, who must navigate their way through society (as if "walking without touching the ground," in Zhuāngzǐ's famous phrase [C 117; W 58]), but are not nearly as important to the broader universe as most think themselves to be.
The ideas of liberation or even autonomy do not capture the "conforming" activity of the Zhuangzian sage as he responds to phenomena like an echo or a mirror, free of schemes, greater purposes, and anxiety, as well as most human emotions. 31 Rather than generating his or her own plans, goals, or maxims for action, the sage simply flows along "according" with things. In contrast to the early Confucians, who do strive within lengthy apprenticeships in the practice of ritual, music, and moral and political judgment, Zhuāngzǐ is not advocating the cultivation of stable dispositions and commitments in any usual sense, nor does he suggest that people should seek out a teacher and remain loyal and obedient to him and his teachings. People need specific kinds of teaching, Zhuāngzǐ seems to be saying, in order to bring about the negative epiphanies that reorient them from human concerns to a grasp of things as they are, and the flexible, creative equanimity that goes with this transformation-but we do not ordinarily need lengthy apprenticeships nor the virtues that might be thought to accompany these, especially obedience.
On the contrary, such counterfeit "virtues," including Confucian values such as benevolence and righteousness, are a sign of inflexibility and delusion.
Within the Inner Chapters of the Zhuāngzǐ, positive accounts of cultivation are quite rare and seem to focus on either purifying one's negation of delusory convictions or personal practice in the mastery of some craft, which is understood as a metaphor for the art of living more generally. This latter sort of practice can often be done alone, even if teachers can catalyze the process with their strange, penetrating words that lead to flashes of insight.
In the end, human masters are for the most part recast in the Zhuāngzǐ as crucial but transient figures. One character, Xǔ Yóu, composes an impromptu poem to explain the "broad outlines" to the aspiring but previously misguided student Yìérzǐ, describing his "teacher" or "master," shī 師, as follows: "He chops fine the myriad things but not for justice, he gives moisture to myriad ages but not for benevolence, he has lasted longer than high antiquity but isn't old, he covers heaven and supports earth, and carves up a multitude of forms but isn't skillful-this is where to roam" (C 202-3; W 89-90 Even though this description of the "orientation" of the sage might suggest that people are "free" to discover the truth for themselves, the rest of the text sharply undercuts such a reading. Regular people are depicted as benighted, lost in dreams even when seemingly awake (C 84-85; W 46-48). Even those with the "talent of a sage" still need training to achieve their potential (C 183-84; W 82-83). Zhuāngzǐ's vision undercuts certain key presumptions of most pictures of humans as autonomous and free, instead suggesting that we need assistance to become "true people." The text itself seems to function as a guide for evaluating candidates for mastery, mocking and attacking many famous contenders, and refiguring Confucius himself as its most prominent spokesman. Ultimately, it seems, the Inner Chapters offer themselves as a substitute for actual flesh and blood teachers, drawing careful readers through a sequence of unusual lessons, with the apparent hope that at least some of them will be suitable and effective, stripping away the pseudo-knowledge that readers bring to the text but must learn to leave behind if they are to follow Zhuāngzǐ's daò.
Conclusion
Zhuāngzǐ's radical diagnosis of the human condition is unlikely to convince Western views of autonomous agency and the accounts of both normal and sagely human activity in the Zhuāngzǐ. In particular, Zhuāngzǐ argues that human beings, even the most talented, need assistance from others, specifically teachers with superior insight (however unusual such teachers may be), in order to fulfill whatever promise they may have. And once awakened, "true people" are not "free" to do whatever they desire, but instead spontaneously "accord" with the natural and social worlds as they objectively are, even if a clear vision of the world allows plenty of room to "roam" around in most situations. Moreover, several stories are premised on the existence of stark hierarchies of religious or philosophical attainment, where only a few have mastered the arts of "forgetting" and perceiving necessary to respond to situations like a mirror. Nor is this vision used to justify dismantling or even critiquing existing social forms; if anything, social forms are to be left as they are and simply interpreted and responded to differently. In the end, just like the Confucians, Zhuāngzǐ celebrates his own distinctive brand of mastery, and the teaching hierarchies it creates and requires.
Notes
1. By "hierarchy" I mean to refer to various social relations of superiority and inferiority, such as ruler/ruled, manager/worker, parent/child, and teacher/student, as well as the classic master/slave pattern. By "authority" I mean being sufficiently stalnak er Mastery, Authority, and Hierarchy trusted by one's audience that one's communications are judged truthful and important, at least prima facie, and thus should be acted upon. 2. For a fuller statement of this sort of vision of human beings, see Midgley (2002) . 3. The idea of "mastering" something suggests a number of possible dangers, including (1) a model of total control and possession akin to that of the slave owner, and (2) a delusional sense of perfect capability that denies human finitude and frailty. I intend to explore these more thoroughly in the larger project, but not here. 4. The person most responsible for the post-World War II liberal democratic suspicion of perfectionism is probably Isaiah Berlin, the celebrated philosopher and intellectual historian. See especially Berlin (1998) . 5. The first edition was published in 1861, and it has gone through numerous British and American editions since. It is still in print today. 6. For more historical insight into these developments, see Benton (2002) and Brewer (2005) . I thank Kirsten Sword for discussions of these points and guidance into the scholarly literature. 7. For a fine introduction to some of these issues, as well as the vast literature on slavery in the West, see Harrill (2006) . 8. Social contract thinking begins with initial formulations in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, for example, but continues all the way to the present, most notably in the political philosophies of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas and their defenders. Needless to say, adequately addressing differences between the accounts of autonomy in these thinkers, or in other liberals such as J. S. Mill, is far beyond the scope of this paper. 9. See especially Callan (1997) and Gutmann (1987) . On liberal democracy as a cultural tradition, see Stout (2004) . Note also important feminist studies that argue for similar points about autonomy from different points of view. See, for example, Griffith (1997) , Mahmood (2005) , and Bucar (2010) . 10. Even Kant recognized this to a certain degree, for instance in his shorter text On Education (2003) . For a more recent attempt to articulate such a position, see MacIntyre (1999) . 11. See most recently Rosemont and Ames (2009) , especially the lengthy introduction. 12. The reasons for the gradual change in Europeans' views of Chinese civilization from a typically laudatory, even envious early modern interpretation (in Leibniz and Voltaire, for example), to later more frequently contemptuous views of China as hidebound, corrupt, and authoritarian, are very complex, and obviously beyond the scope of this paper. 13. Despite this lack of explicit theoretical justification for social hierarchies in terms of differential "natures," early Chinese cultural groups were agrarian kingdoms with stark class divides and frequent recourse to corvée labor, and are aptly described as patriarchal. I have no desire to idealize them as social models. 14. For a good overview of early Chinese history, see Loewe and Shaughnessy (1999) . 15. My own sense is that different texts need to be analyzed individually, rather than assuming that all early texts were put together in the same way, for example, through gradual "accretion." stalnak er Mastery, Authority, and Hierarchy song in which he laments his poverty. Master Sāng in the end regards his current situation as a manifestation of mìng 命, the "decree" of Heaven. Presumably this is a way to accept the inevitable, but the story provides no clear resolution of his lament (C 208; W 91). 31. I borrow the language of "conformity" from Brindley (2010) . Brindley unfortunately reverts to language of freedom and autonomy when describing Zhuāngzǐ's ideas, despite the "ironic" contrast with his Dao-conformity (58-59). 32. The relation of their views with more subtle versions of an autonomy ideal is complex, and deserves a fuller treatment elsewhere.
